ProjectLandlocked — the future of Central Asia

Nobody is choosing

Five landlocked states are being courted by three Western powers, two rival technology blocs, and the two neighbours they cannot leave. The striking thing is how few of them are picking a side — and how well that is working for them.

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Boundaries from Natural Earth 1:50m public-domain data, projected equirectangular with a standard parallel at 45°N and simplified for display. Route alignments are indicative, drawn through real waypoints rather than surveyed.

The argument

Since November 2025 this region has acquired a United States leaders' summit, an EU strategic partnership, a British ministerial format, an Abraham Accords signatory, and seats in both of the world's competing technology blocs. Read as a run of headlines, it looks like a pivot westward.

Read against what happened with Moscow over the same months, it looks like something less dramatic and more interesting. In the year Tokayev publicly asked Putin to stop the war in Ukraine, Kazakhstan also recorded its highest-ever trade with Russia, signed a currency swap, and agreed to have Rosatom build two nuclear units. Nothing was traded away. The Western gains were additions, not substitutions.

So the organising question of this brief is not whether Central Asia is turning west. It is not. The question is what a middle power should do with a region that has become very good at accepting offers from everyone — and whether the West's current instinct, which is increasingly to demand exclusivity, is the right response or precisely the wrong one.

The argument is set out across , published as it developed. This page is the standing summary.

Why the brief is called Landlocked

Every state here is landlocked, and Uzbekistan is one of only two countries on earth that is doubly landlocked — every one of its neighbours is landlocked too. That is not trivia. It means no government in the region can reach a customer without a third country's consent, which is why Kazakhstan can criticise Moscow publicly and still be unable to act on the criticism. Geography sets the ceiling on how far any realignment can go, and most commentary on this region ignores it.

≈80%of Kazakh oil exports run through one Russian-transiting pipeline
$29bnrecord Russia–Kazakhstan trade in 2025 — the year Tokayev broke with Moscow in public
4 of 5Central Asian states that joined China's AI bloc in July 2026
1 of 5that joined America's

The five states are not moving together

A structural divergence is opening up. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have the diplomatic bandwidth, the reserves and the reform record to be courted. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan largely do not, and Western concentration on the top two risks pushing the other three toward Moscow and Beijing by default. The country data behind that divergence is set out in the next section.

Five states, one label, very little in common

Treating Central Asia as a bloc is the first analytical error. A country where remittances are half of GDP and one that supplies two-fifths of the world's uranium do not have the same interests, the same leverage, or the same room to manoeuvre.

The comparison that matters

Remittances and growth: World Bank open data, 2024 values. Median age: UNICEF, Generation 2050 in Central Asia, November 2025, 2025 values. Turkmenistan remittance data is not published by the World Bank and is shown as unavailable rather than estimated.

CountryMedian age (2025)Remittances, % GDP (2024)GDP growth (2024)Defining endowment
Kazakhstan29.70.1%5.0%Uranium, oil, rare earths, the transit landmass
Uzbekistan27.014.4%6.5%Population, gold, copper, the most diversified economy in the region
Turkmenistan26.9not published6.3%Natural gas — reserves ranked fourth in the world
Kyrgyzstan25.426.6%9.0%Hydropower, gold, and an unusually open political system by regional standards
Tajikistan22.247.9%8.4%Hydropower — and the deepest labour dependency on Russia anywhere in the region

The single most important number on this page

Remittances were 47.9% of Tajikistan's GDP in 2024 and 26.6% of Kyrgyzstan's. Over 80% of migration flows from both countries went to Russia as of 2023. No Western package of any plausible size substitutes for that. Any strategy that ignores labour mobility is not addressing the binding constraint on those two states.

Uzbekistan is the region's largest population at over 38 million, one of only two doubly landlocked countries in the world, and the only state bordering all four other Central Asian countries as well as Afghanistan. Real GDP grew 7.7% in 2025, exports rose 24% led by gold, copper, zinc, uranium goods, food and fertilizers, and international reserves reached $70bn.

World Bank country overview · worldbank.org

Kazakhstan produced about 25,839 tonnes of uranium in 2025, roughly 40% of world output, and is moving deliberately up the value chain — a fuel pellet fabrication plant opened in 2021 and reached its 200 tU/year design capacity in 2024. In an October 2024 referendum, 70% of voters backed new nuclear energy.

World Nuclear Association country profile · world-nuclear.org

Turkmenistan holds proven gas reserves ranked fourth globally after Iran, Russia and Qatar, with the Galkynysh field alone accounting for the large majority of the national total. Reserve estimates vary widely between auditors and official statements, and Ashgabat has at times claimed figures far above independent assessments.

Oil & Gas Journal · ogj.com — note this assessment is a decade old; VOA has separately documented the gap between Turkmen claims and audited estimates.

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan hold no significant fossil fuel reserves but sit on the bulk of the region's hydropower potential; Central Asia as a whole accounts for around 5.5% of world hydropower potential, most of it undeveloped. This is the basis of the region's water–energy bargain: upstream states hold the water, downstream states hold the gas.

Peer-reviewed analysis in Economic Analysis and Policy · sciencedirect.com; World Bank Central Asia Energy-Water Development Program.

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Harry Pye

I am an international relations student from Wales, based in London. I write on foreign policy and policy design, with a particular interest in the places that sit at the edge of Western attention and the institutional questions that decide what happens there. I also write about British, Welsh, and European politics and culture.

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We have no idea how much money is leaving Britain

Bangladesh’s central bank wants to know why the money arriving from Britain jumped $2 billion in one year. We don’t know, and nobody seems to be asking.

The Tower of London overlaid with a map of South Asia and a pound coin. Composite by deKilpeck.

Last month Bangladesh’s government answered parliamentary questions on remittances. In the year to June, Bangladeshis abroad sent home $35.6 billion, a record high. Saudi Arabia remained the largest source, with the UK in second at $5.07bn, up from $3.1bn the year before. That’s an increase of sixty per cent in a single year, against seventeen per cent for remittances as a whole.

It has only continued to increase too. Between July and September, $1.22bn arrived from the UK, a third higher than the same quarter last year. While this itself isn’t evidence of fraud, the increase has raised eyebrows and prompted investigation.

Bangladesh noticed this before us. In May, when figures were still coming in, a Bangladesh Bank spokesman said the central bank would be investigating this and act if necessary. An official said that even allowing for changes in how the money is recorded, there was no explanation for the sudden rise from the UK. Bank directors have concurred, seeing the increase as inexplicable. Mustafizur Rahman of the Centre for Policy Dialogue, a Dhaka think tank, went further, suggesting that much of the money could be the proceeds of money laundering, masquerading as wages.

So the Bangladeshi government wants to know why so much money is arriving from Britain. Strangely, the British state has shown little interest in the same question.

There is a partial explanation in that transfers via American-based wiring companies were listed as American in source, regardless of where they truly came from, until about a year and a half ago, but that was largely collected from the Gulf and totalled around $1.7bn. The Bangladeshi central bank isn’t convinced these recording changes have impacted the British numbers.

Awkwardly, Britain couldn’t settle the question entirely, even if it wanted to. The ONS has confirmed that we don’t publish official figures for how much money is sent out of this country, broken down by destination. What we know, we know from the recipients. The State Bank of Pakistan says $6.3bn arrived from Britain in the same twelve months, and India recorded around $12.8bn. Including Bangladesh, the subcontinent received around $24bn in a year. We only hear about it if their governments are generous enough to tell us, partly because they’re worried about its legality.

Money arriving from the UK, as recorded by each receiving country. Bangladesh and Pakistan: years to June. India: 2023-24, its latest survey. Britain publishes no equivalent breakdown of its own.

Fundamentally, I don’t think there's much wrong with an individual sending some of their wages to support loved ones back home. This is what immigrants have always done, including British emigrants overseas. It’s an individual’s own financial decision with their own hard-earned money.

But some money that leaves Britain wasn’t earned; instead, it began as public money. A decade ago, a ring run by an accountant in East London, Chowdhury Muyeed, and his wife Asma, used fake jobs and a single address to process benefit claims for Bangladeshis who had taken Italian citizenship and flew in to sign on, often going home the same day. Redbridge and Tower Hamlets councils lost at least £1.6 million to their scam, and the Department for Work and Pensions a further £420,000. Muyeed went to prison for five years for the scheme.

Tower Hamlets itself has had ministerial envoys since November 2024, after inspectors found an unacceptable level of patronage from the Aspire-run council. I don’t know how much of the over £1.1 billion in benefits paid to Tower Hamlets’ residents ends up abroad, but neither does the government, which is the problem.

America has started to take action. Since the start of this year, the U.S. has charged a one per cent tax on remittances, but is struggling to impose it on direct bank transfers. The tax was first proposed at 5% but was whittled down in Congress. This is not America ending remittances, as some are describing it, but it does put a small price and a paper trail on the transfers banks can’t trace.

Britain should follow America’s lead, and then go further. A levy on cash transfers, a requirement that money-transfer firms report these transfers based on destination, so the next time Bangladesh reports a 60% increase it isn’t news to the treasury. Proper source-of-funds checks above a modest threshold, of the kind any of us face when we try to move a house deposit, for example.

There are people on the right who want to go further too. The Critic argued for a levy of ten to twenty per cent on all remittances, and some would like to see them banned altogether, on the grounds that we cannot be seeing billions, potentially from welfare, leave our country each year. It’s a valid argument; this flow of capital came about through the cracks of the system, subsequently tolerated by the state, with no democratic mandate behind it. I don’t think an outright ban on remittances would produce a net benefit, and along with high taxes on the practice, it would likely just drive the system underground into the hawala/hundi networks, which would make it far more difficult for the government to track cash flows. Moreover, remittances are far more effective than all the aid the government gives to these countries, which is especially pertinent since we have just cut our own aid budget significantly.

Nevertheless, I am far more convinced that action should be taken than a year ago, and those are reasons to be careful on how to approach the issue, not reasons to avoid tackling the problem. Meanwhile, the same people who are telling us that the issue is overblown or conspiratorial can’t even tell us how much money leaves the UK, nor where it goes. They are in no position to tell us these aren’t valid concerns and aren’t symptomatic of other deeper problems. Importantly, the state must take a moment to be self-reflective and ask: Why is Bangladesh more curious about the UK than the British state?

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