ProjectLandlocked — the future of Central Asia

Nobody is choosing

Five landlocked states are being courted by three Western powers, two rival technology blocs, and the two neighbours they cannot leave. The striking thing is how few of them are picking a side — and how well that is working for them.

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Tap any territory for its current alignment position.

Boundaries from Natural Earth 1:50m public-domain data, projected equirectangular with a standard parallel at 45°N and simplified for display. Route alignments are indicative, drawn through real waypoints rather than surveyed.

The argument

Since November 2025 this region has acquired a United States leaders' summit, an EU strategic partnership, a British ministerial format, an Abraham Accords signatory, and seats in both of the world's competing technology blocs. Read as a run of headlines, it looks like a pivot westward.

Read against what happened with Moscow over the same months, it looks like something less dramatic and more interesting. In the year Tokayev publicly asked Putin to stop the war in Ukraine, Kazakhstan also recorded its highest-ever trade with Russia, signed a currency swap, and agreed to have Rosatom build two nuclear units. Nothing was traded away. The Western gains were additions, not substitutions.

So the organising question of this brief is not whether Central Asia is turning west. It is not. The question is what a middle power should do with a region that has become very good at accepting offers from everyone — and whether the West's current instinct, which is increasingly to demand exclusivity, is the right response or precisely the wrong one.

The argument is set out across , published as it developed. This page is the standing summary.

Why the brief is called Landlocked

Every state here is landlocked, and Uzbekistan is one of only two countries on earth that is doubly landlocked — every one of its neighbours is landlocked too. That is not trivia. It means no government in the region can reach a customer without a third country's consent, which is why Kazakhstan can criticise Moscow publicly and still be unable to act on the criticism. Geography sets the ceiling on how far any realignment can go, and most commentary on this region ignores it.

≈80%of Kazakh oil exports run through one Russian-transiting pipeline
$29bnrecord Russia–Kazakhstan trade in 2025 — the year Tokayev broke with Moscow in public
4 of 5Central Asian states that joined China's AI bloc in July 2026
1 of 5that joined America's

The five states are not moving together

A structural divergence is opening up. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have the diplomatic bandwidth, the reserves and the reform record to be courted. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan largely do not, and Western concentration on the top two risks pushing the other three toward Moscow and Beijing by default. The country data behind that divergence is set out in the next section.

Five states, one label, very little in common

Treating Central Asia as a bloc is the first analytical error. A country where remittances are half of GDP and one that supplies two-fifths of the world's uranium do not have the same interests, the same leverage, or the same room to manoeuvre.

The comparison that matters

Remittances and growth: World Bank open data, 2024 values. Median age: UNICEF, Generation 2050 in Central Asia, November 2025, 2025 values. Turkmenistan remittance data is not published by the World Bank and is shown as unavailable rather than estimated.

CountryMedian age (2025)Remittances, % GDP (2024)GDP growth (2024)Defining endowment
Kazakhstan29.70.1%5.0%Uranium, oil, rare earths, the transit landmass
Uzbekistan27.014.4%6.5%Population, gold, copper, the most diversified economy in the region
Turkmenistan26.9not published6.3%Natural gas — reserves ranked fourth in the world
Kyrgyzstan25.426.6%9.0%Hydropower, gold, and an unusually open political system by regional standards
Tajikistan22.247.9%8.4%Hydropower — and the deepest labour dependency on Russia anywhere in the region

The single most important number on this page

Remittances were 47.9% of Tajikistan's GDP in 2024 and 26.6% of Kyrgyzstan's. Over 80% of migration flows from both countries went to Russia as of 2023. No Western package of any plausible size substitutes for that. Any strategy that ignores labour mobility is not addressing the binding constraint on those two states.

Uzbekistan is the region's largest population at over 38 million, one of only two doubly landlocked countries in the world, and the only state bordering all four other Central Asian countries as well as Afghanistan. Real GDP grew 7.7% in 2025, exports rose 24% led by gold, copper, zinc, uranium goods, food and fertilizers, and international reserves reached $70bn.

World Bank country overview · worldbank.org

Kazakhstan produced about 25,839 tonnes of uranium in 2025, roughly 40% of world output, and is moving deliberately up the value chain — a fuel pellet fabrication plant opened in 2021 and reached its 200 tU/year design capacity in 2024. In an October 2024 referendum, 70% of voters backed new nuclear energy.

World Nuclear Association country profile · world-nuclear.org

Turkmenistan holds proven gas reserves ranked fourth globally after Iran, Russia and Qatar, with the Galkynysh field alone accounting for the large majority of the national total. Reserve estimates vary widely between auditors and official statements, and Ashgabat has at times claimed figures far above independent assessments.

Oil & Gas Journal · ogj.com — note this assessment is a decade old; VOA has separately documented the gap between Turkmen claims and audited estimates.

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan hold no significant fossil fuel reserves but sit on the bulk of the region's hydropower potential; Central Asia as a whole accounts for around 5.5% of world hydropower potential, most of it undeveloped. This is the basis of the region's water–energy bargain: upstream states hold the water, downstream states hold the gas.

Peer-reviewed analysis in Economic Analysis and Policy · sciencedirect.com; World Bank Central Asia Energy-Water Development Program.

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Harry Pye

I am an international relations student from Wales, based in London. I write on foreign policy and policy design, with a particular interest in the places that sit at the edge of Western attention and the institutional questions that decide what happens there. I also write about British, Welsh, and European politics and culture.

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Spain: Schengen's Trojan Horse

Madrid spent two years building the largest pull factor in Europe. This week the bill arrived.

Spanish police on the shoreline at Ceuta after the crossings. Credit: Europa Press.
Spanish police on the shoreline at Ceuta after the crossings. Credit: Europa Press.

There is a particular sound a political consensus makes when it finally gives way, and Europe heard it this week at a breakwater in North Africa. On Thursday, tens of thousands of people walked and swam around the Tarajal seawall into Ceuta, a Spanish city of fewer than 90,000 souls on the Moroccan coast. Ceuta's president, Juan Jesús Vivas, the Mayor-President of the exclave, put the number at around 60,000 in twenty-four hours. More than two-thirds of the city's population. By Friday the death toll had climbed from 18 to at least 34, as people drowned in the strait, and others were crushed in the scramble at the seawall.

Pedro Sánchez called it "a serious crisis for Spain and for Europe" and blamed the traffickers. This is the reflex of every European government caught without a border: locate the villain offshore, in a smuggler's boat, anywhere but in the cabinet room. It will not wash this time, because the proximate cause of this catastrophe is not a criminal network. It is a judgment of Spain's own Supreme Court, handed down on 29 June, and a government that saw what was coming and did nothing.

That ruling held that Spain's power of summary rejection at the frontier — rechazo en frontera, the "hot returns" that have kept Ceuta and Melilla viable for a decade — applies only to those who climb the physical barriers. Anyone intercepted in the water falls outside it. The message could not have been clearer for prospective illegal migrants: just go around it. For a fortnight there was what a Guardia Civil officer described as a slow trickle, some 1,500 to 2,000 people in ten days. Then, in his words, "an explosion."

A serious state, presented with a court ruling that dismantles its border, legislates. Spain had a month. Spain did nothing, and then rejected Ceuta's request for a formal national emergency on the grounds that migration does not fit the statutory categories, a magnificently Spanish answer, and one that will be quoted for years. Troops went in eventually. Some returns to Morocco were agreed. It is bailing out a hull that is still gushing in water.

  • 29 June

    The Supreme Court holds that summary rejection at the frontier applies only to those who climb the barriers. Anyone intercepted in the water falls outside it.

  • Early July

    A slow trickle, in the words of one Guardia Civil officer: some 1,500 to 2,000 people over ten days.

  • 30 July

    Thousands gather on the Moroccan side and cross on foot and by sea. Spain's interior ministry puts the day's arrivals at around 50,000; Ceuta's president puts it at 60,000.

  • 31 July

    Italy announces the suspension of Schengen free movement with Spain. France orders checks at the Spanish border stepped up without delay. Ceuta's request for a national emergency has already been refused.

A month passed between the ruling and the surge. Sources: Spanish Supreme Court judgment of 29 June; Spanish interior ministry figures; statements by Juan Jesús Vivas; Italian and French interior ministry announcements of 31 July.

Giorgia Meloni and Antonio Tajani, the Deputy Italian PM, have called for Spain's suspension from Schengen. Legally this isn't possible as no member state can expel another, and they know that. What Italy could do, it did. On Thursday evening Meloni, Tajani and Matteo Salvini announced the temporary suspension of Schengen free movement with Spain, and Rome's interior ministry ordered targeted, selective checks on non-EU travellers arriving from Spanish airports and seaports. Tajani called it a necessary choice, made unavoidable by events. Spain's foreign minister, José Manuel Albares, summoned Italy's ambassador in Madrid and accused Tajani of weaponising migration for domestic advantage.

Madrid's other answer to Rome was to publish the numbers. Citing Frontex figures, Sánchez pointed out that fewer irregular entries have come through Spain than through Italy over the past five years, and by a wide margin.

Frontex figures published by Pedro Sánchez in response to the Italian government, 31 July 2026. On the volume of arrivals Sánchez has a point. It is not, however, an answer to what Spain does with the people once they are inside.

What matters is what France did while this was happening. Laurent Nuñez, the interior minister, ordered controls at the Spanish frontier stepped up immediately. Not proposed, not tabled for a European Council in the autumn, but ordered and in place overnight. Ursula von der Leyen called the images from Ceuta "unacceptable" and said dangerous crossings must stop.

The lesson is the one Europe keeps refusing to learn. Schengen is not a treaty so much as a standing bet: that every member polices its stretch of the perimeter as though the whole continent depended on it, because it does. Break that bet in one place, and the internal borders come back everywhere, not by grand decision, but by interior ministers quietly signing orders on a Thursday night. France, Italy, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Poland and others have already reintroduced internal checks under one justification or another. Ceuta did not begin Schengen's unravelling. It simply made it undeniable.

The policy, arriving all at once

Here is the part Madrid would rather you did not dwell on. Ceuta is not an aberration in Spanish migration policy. It is that policy, arriving all at once instead of quietly over years.

On 1 January this year, Spain passed 10 million foreign-born residents for the first time, 10,004,581, or 20.3 per cent of the population. Spain's population grew by roughly 442,000 over the year, overwhelmingly through immigration. One in five people in Spain was born somewhere else. No mandate was sought for this. No manifesto proposed it. It simply happened, and the political class agreed among themselves that noticing it was vulgar.

Spanish National Statistics Institute figures, 1 January each year. The share rose by more than seven points in eleven years, and by 2.1 points in the last two alone.

Then, on 27 January, Sánchez went further, adopting by royal decree the regularisation of some 500,000 undocumented migrants and asylum seekers. The Council of Ministers approved it on 14 April and it entered into force the following day. It is the seventh such amnesty in forty years, the largest in two decades, and one of the largest ever attempted anywhere in Europe. Even the European Commission balked. Ask what signal that sends to a young man in Casablanca watching it on his phone, and you are told that pull factors are a far-right myth. Ask the Guardia Civil at Tarajal.

The government's defence is that the regularised will hold one-year Spanish permits and cannot legally work elsewhere in the EU until they obtain permanent residence. Read that sentence again and notice everything it does not say. A Spanish residence permit allows travel throughout Schengen for ninety days in any hundred and eighty, and the entire architecture of Schengen is the absence of anyone checking on day ninety-one. More to the point, Spain is the most generous manufacturer of EU passports on the continent. It granted 240,200 citizenships in 2023, 22.9 per cent of the EU total, more than any other member state, and 252,500 in 2024, second only to Germany. Nationals of Latin American countries, the Philippines, Equatorial Guinea, Andorra and Portugal need just two years' residence to naturalise, against ten for everyone else. Those regularised this April become eligible for citizenship in a decade.

What Madrid says

  • The regularised hold one-year Spanish permits.
  • They cannot legally work elsewhere in the EU until they obtain permanent residence.
  • Pull factors are a far-right myth.
  • The Ceuta crossings have nothing to do with the regularisation.

What actually follows

  • A Spanish permit allows travel throughout Schengen for ninety days in any hundred and eighty.
  • Nobody checks on day ninety-one. That absence is the whole architecture.
  • Spain granted 240,200 citizenships in 2023 — 22.9 per cent of the EU total.
  • Ibero-Americans, Filipinos, Equatoguineans, Andorrans and Portuguese naturalise after two years, not ten.

Left column: the Spanish government's stated position. Right column: what the same rules permit.

A Spanish passport is not a Spanish document. It is a European one, and it confers the unconditional right to live and work in Munich, Milan, and Mayo. Madrid is not merely admitting people to Spain. It is admitting them to the rest of Europe, on terms it sets alone, and then presenting the bill to countries that were never consulted.

That is the Trojan horse. Not the enclave, not the seawall, not even the ruling, but a member state that has quietly appointed itself Europe's naturalisation office while assuring everyone that internal free movement is sacred and that anyone who mentions the arithmetic is a bigot.

Vox's Santiago Abascal called the events at Ceuta an invasion, and the respectable press spent Friday deploring his language rather than examining his figures. Vox could take twenty per cent at the election next year, and the same commentators will write the same baffled columns about the rise of populism.

Added 2 August

This piece was published on 31 July. Since then the Spanish outlet The Objective has reported that intelligence assessments warning of the coming surge existed before it happened, according to internal sources. The government denies it. If the reporting stands up, the charge against Madrid is not that it failed to see this coming. It is that it did.

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