ProjectLandlocked — the future of Central Asia

Nobody is choosing

Five landlocked states are being courted by three Western powers, two rival technology blocs, and the two neighbours they cannot leave. The striking thing is how few of them are picking a side — and how well that is working for them.

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Boundaries from Natural Earth 1:50m public-domain data, projected equirectangular with a standard parallel at 45°N and simplified for display. Route alignments are indicative, drawn through real waypoints rather than surveyed.

The argument

Since November 2025 this region has acquired a United States leaders' summit, an EU strategic partnership, a British ministerial format, an Abraham Accords signatory, and seats in both of the world's competing technology blocs. Read as a run of headlines, it looks like a pivot westward.

Read against what happened with Moscow over the same months, it looks like something less dramatic and more interesting. In the year Tokayev publicly asked Putin to stop the war in Ukraine, Kazakhstan also recorded its highest-ever trade with Russia, signed a currency swap, and agreed to have Rosatom build two nuclear units. Nothing was traded away. The Western gains were additions, not substitutions.

So the organising question of this brief is not whether Central Asia is turning west. It is not. The question is what a middle power should do with a region that has become very good at accepting offers from everyone — and whether the West's current instinct, which is increasingly to demand exclusivity, is the right response or precisely the wrong one.

The argument is set out across , published as it developed. This page is the standing summary.

Why the brief is called Landlocked

Every state here is landlocked, and Uzbekistan is one of only two countries on earth that is doubly landlocked — every one of its neighbours is landlocked too. That is not trivia. It means no government in the region can reach a customer without a third country's consent, which is why Kazakhstan can criticise Moscow publicly and still be unable to act on the criticism. Geography sets the ceiling on how far any realignment can go, and most commentary on this region ignores it.

≈80%of Kazakh oil exports run through one Russian-transiting pipeline
$29bnrecord Russia–Kazakhstan trade in 2025 — the year Tokayev broke with Moscow in public
4 of 5Central Asian states that joined China's AI bloc in July 2026
1 of 5that joined America's

The five states are not moving together

A structural divergence is opening up. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have the diplomatic bandwidth, the reserves and the reform record to be courted. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan largely do not, and Western concentration on the top two risks pushing the other three toward Moscow and Beijing by default. The country data behind that divergence is set out in the next section.

Five states, one label, very little in common

Treating Central Asia as a bloc is the first analytical error. A country where remittances are half of GDP and one that supplies two-fifths of the world's uranium do not have the same interests, the same leverage, or the same room to manoeuvre.

The comparison that matters

Remittances and growth: World Bank open data, 2024 values. Median age: UNICEF, Generation 2050 in Central Asia, November 2025, 2025 values. Turkmenistan remittance data is not published by the World Bank and is shown as unavailable rather than estimated.

CountryMedian age (2025)Remittances, % GDP (2024)GDP growth (2024)Defining endowment
Kazakhstan29.70.1%5.0%Uranium, oil, rare earths, the transit landmass
Uzbekistan27.014.4%6.5%Population, gold, copper, the most diversified economy in the region
Turkmenistan26.9not published6.3%Natural gas — reserves ranked fourth in the world
Kyrgyzstan25.426.6%9.0%Hydropower, gold, and an unusually open political system by regional standards
Tajikistan22.247.9%8.4%Hydropower — and the deepest labour dependency on Russia anywhere in the region

The single most important number on this page

Remittances were 47.9% of Tajikistan's GDP in 2024 and 26.6% of Kyrgyzstan's. Over 80% of migration flows from both countries went to Russia as of 2023. No Western package of any plausible size substitutes for that. Any strategy that ignores labour mobility is not addressing the binding constraint on those two states.

Uzbekistan is the region's largest population at over 38 million, one of only two doubly landlocked countries in the world, and the only state bordering all four other Central Asian countries as well as Afghanistan. Real GDP grew 7.7% in 2025, exports rose 24% led by gold, copper, zinc, uranium goods, food and fertilizers, and international reserves reached $70bn.

World Bank country overview · worldbank.org

Kazakhstan produced about 25,839 tonnes of uranium in 2025, roughly 40% of world output, and is moving deliberately up the value chain — a fuel pellet fabrication plant opened in 2021 and reached its 200 tU/year design capacity in 2024. In an October 2024 referendum, 70% of voters backed new nuclear energy.

World Nuclear Association country profile · world-nuclear.org

Turkmenistan holds proven gas reserves ranked fourth globally after Iran, Russia and Qatar, with the Galkynysh field alone accounting for the large majority of the national total. Reserve estimates vary widely between auditors and official statements, and Ashgabat has at times claimed figures far above independent assessments.

Oil & Gas Journal · ogj.com — note this assessment is a decade old; VOA has separately documented the gap between Turkmen claims and audited estimates.

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan hold no significant fossil fuel reserves but sit on the bulk of the region's hydropower potential; Central Asia as a whole accounts for around 5.5% of world hydropower potential, most of it undeveloped. This is the basis of the region's water–energy bargain: upstream states hold the water, downstream states hold the gas.

Peer-reviewed analysis in Economic Analysis and Policy · sciencedirect.com; World Bank Central Asia Energy-Water Development Program.

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Harry Pye

I am an international relations student from Wales, based in London. I write on foreign policy and policy design, with a particular interest in the places that sit at the edge of Western attention and the institutional questions that decide what happens there. I also write about British, Welsh, and European politics and culture.

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How to win the young without losing yourself

On Sunday Sweden's Moderates took thirty per cent of first-time voters and took back their place as the kingdom's second-largest party after four years in government. Meanwhile the Conservatives are on a pitiful eight per cent with the same group. The difference isn't, however, what you would assume.

Young Moderates supporters wave party flags in Stockholm. Credit: Per Pettersson.
Young Moderates supporters wave party flags in Stockholm. Credit: Per Pettersson.

This number should be encouraging for the Tories, but it ought to lead to some self-reflection too. Sweden’s election saw nearly a third of the youngest voters choose the moderates. Not 30% of the total right-wing vote, but 30% outright. Making it by far the largest party among the cohort, above the centre-left Social Democrats at 20%, and the populist-right Sweden Democrats at just 15% (according to the Swedish national broadcaster and Verian). The national school poll saw similar results, with 33% of under-18s voting Moderate, well clear of any opposition.

Vote share among 18–21 year olds, from SVT’s exit poll. Shares are rounded and sum to 98 per cent; the pie is scaled to the reported figures. Graphic after SVT Datajournalistik.

The equivalent figure for British youth is around 8% and as low as 5%, compared with the Greens at a terrifying 37%. Reform is at roughly double this. And with Kemi Badenoch’s latest ratings showing her worst performance being among under-35s, how can the Conservatives hope to maintain themselves as a political movement?

Two centre-right parties. Both with recent records in government. One dominating the youth vote, the other is in the margin of error of oblivion. The obvious explanations for why this happened aren’t sufficient, so what can the Conservatives learn from Ulf Kristersson’s Moderates?

The recent events in Sweden are incomprehensible to the British politico. The Moderates have governed for the last four years, propped up by the often-extremist Sweden Democrats, through a painful cost-of-living squeeze and a gang-violence crisis that has seen violence rampant through Sweden’s cities. By any British assumption, they should have been slaughtered at the polls, with Kristersson leading his party to a Sunak-esque rump. Instead, their vote share actually went up by a point, and they gained 2 seats. While the right-wing bloc appears to have lost, with the left bloc ahead at 176 seats to the right’s 173 at time of writing, the moderates are the only party of the three largest, to have come out of the election larger than they went in.

The party that got hammered on Sunday was actually their populist partner, who fell from 20.5 to 17.5, losing eleven seats and dropping to third place. Among first-time voters, they dropped 7 points, with the Moderates picking up four.

So while the young as a whole did not swing right, they didn’t swing left either. Instead, young right-wing Swedes stopped voting for the insurgent, in favour of the governing party. This is one of the most interesting electoral anomalies in Europe at this moment, and CCHQ should be studying what happened here, rather than putting out more TikTok memes comparing Andy Burnham to David Brent.

So why did this happen? And it doesn’t have anything to do with social media.

The first is that Ulf Kristersson did something the Tories have refused to do: he defended his record. He campaigned, with a certain brass neck, on the slogan of making Sweden great again (MSGA, not quite the same ring). He pointed to the numbers: annual migration down from 117,000 in 2016 to 12,000 last year, consistently falling crime, and a tougher legal regime. Whatever one thinks of his policies, young Swedes could look to a man who did what he said he would and is asking for four years to finish this.

Contrast the Tories’ approach. Since 2024, the party has behaved as though the last 14 years happened to someone else. They apologise constantly for the immigration (without mentioning the success of Sunak’s reforms), they reach out for the phrase “we got things wrong” so frequently that it only reinforces the perception of their government, instead of owning the many successes in the economic recovery, education or crime. The prevailing narrative has been that, to regain trust, you must show humility by saying this over and over again. In fact, this is an admission that you can’t be trusted with power while simultaneously asking for it back.

The second lesson is one a lot of politicians will find hardest, because it involves a lot of patience. The Sweden Democrats spent the last four years dictating government policy while not taking up any seats in cabinet. They wrote much of the government’s migration agenda and were functionally in power. And, despite the success of the migration policy, the voters punished them for it because they sought power without any responsibility, a perception exposed by Kristersson when he offered them cabinet seats.

There is a comparison here to Reform. Nigel Farage holds the best position in British politics: all the attention, none of the accountability. But that position is not stable, and certainly not one to take him into Downing Street. Once someone can point to something Reform has done rather than said, this position decays, and as Reform gains more and more councils, Reform’s record on social care and potholes might just bite them here. The Moderate’s main achievement through this was to still be standing and looking competent, while their partner’s outsider act wore through.

The third lesson is something the Moderates didn’t do. They didn’t become a tribute act to the populist right. Kristersson’s party remains what it has always been, a liberal-conservative, pro-market, pro-West, party of government. It recovered second place without adopting the vocabulary or style of the party that overtook it in 2022. A lot of Tories’ instincts since 2024 have been to emulate Reform: that in order to win back a defector, you have to agree with them. That doesn’t work. Why choose an imitation with a complicated record when you can have the real thing with a clean slate? The Moderates won these voters back by being unmistakably themselves, and visibly capable of governing, something the insurgent can’t match.

The fourth is dull but matters most. Look at what Swedes said their main priorities were: health, education, crime, immigration, the economy, and social care. That’s a list of things that happen to people in their daily lives. It’s not a list of grievances against institutions or a culture war about what a woman is. Young Swedes didn’t vote Moderate because the party fought these battles online; thirty per cent voted for them because they were presented with a clear plan for how their lives would improve under a Moderate government and a record boasted, rather than hidden from.

There are a few caveats here. Sweden’s system of proportional representation and a formalised right bloc under the Tidö agreement means that Swedes can vote without worrying about splitting the vote, whereas in Britain Conservative and Reform votes can annihilate each other’s chances of winning a seat. The moderates could afford to let the Sweden Democrats exist, lose their appeal, and return their voters without posing an existential threat at any point. The Conservatives may not be able to afford reform the same time. Furthermore, while the Moderates held on, the right as a whole collapsed with young voters. Among men aged 18-29, the Tidö parties fell from 63% to 43%, the Moderates were only successful in increasing their share of a quickly shrinking cake. This is still an achievement and is far more than the Tories have been able to reach since 2010, though it isn’t exactly a triumph either.

What it is, though, is a demonstration that what British Conservatives have long laughed off as impossible is possible. Many Conservatives still say the young are lost to the left for a generation. That the economic system created by the mainstream parties over the last half-century has forced young people to the fringes, and that the Tories should focus on the same base they’ve focused on for the last decade. Sweden suggests otherwise: a third of young people backed a mainstream conservative party, all while a slicker, angrier alternative was on the ballot paper too.

While the Conservatives have taken more initiative with the young, having relaunched the Young Conservatives and expanded their digital reach, this isn’t quite the right way. Kristersson’s party didn’t win the young with an app or a vice-chairman for youth who might just use his position to get hammered at party conference. The moderates won them by being a grown-up option in a crowded field that offered them what they needed without pandering, and refused to be embarrassed about their record. There is no reason a British party can’t do the same; though, at present, there is little sign anyone is trying.

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